

*Reported to
President*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 2, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Preparations for Western Summit;
Procedural Aspects of East-West Summit

The Four-Power Working Group preparing for the Western Summit has not proceeded as rapidly as we would have wished, owing principally to the failure of the French representative to receive any instructions from his Government. We are attempting, however, to stimulate action, and hope that, at the meeting of the Working Group scheduled to take place on December 4, it will be possible to make more rapid progress.

On the American side, in order to facilitate completion of the Working Group report, we have prepared the enclosed draft of a paper which we hope can be agreed, after suitable modification, as a basis for the discussions to take place at the December 19 meeting. If by chance, the French continue to lag, we propose to go ahead with the British and Germans, simply leaving the French position en blanc to be filled in at the meeting.

We thus hope to have available before the Western Summit, and in time for your briefing by me on the way to Paris, an agreed discussion paper which will cover, inter alia, all major procedural aspects of the East-West Summit including date, composition, method of approaching Soviets, and particular topics to be discussed, with an indication of the outstanding questions under each of these points on which decisions will be required from Heads of Governments.

This paper should likewise contain an estimate of Soviet negotiating intentions as well as a discussion of the problems of Germany and Berlin and disarmament. Matching this quadripartite working paper, we would expect to provide a relevant counterpart on the American side suggesting the U.S. position to be taken on the various problems raised. This paper would likewise point out any differences between the participating countries which have emerged during the preparatory exercise.

Christian A. Herter
Christian A. Herter

Enclosure:

Draft Quadripartite Working
Group Report

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Authority <u>MR 87-33 #8</u>
By <u>bc</u> NLE Date <u>2/9/55</u>



December 1, 1959

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~~First Draft of~~ **CLASSIFIED**

AGREED QUADRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP REPORT

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF
FRANCE, GERMANY, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES
PARIS, DECEMBER 19-21, 1959

I. PROCEDURALA. Timing of East-West Summit Meeting

After examining the forward commitments of the Heads of Government of France, the U.K. and the U.S., it appears that the most appropriate date for a meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. would be from April 21-26. It was agreed that Geneva is an appropriate site. The Working Group believes the East-West summit meeting should be preceded by: 1) a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. at Paris from April 14-18; 2) a meeting of these Foreign Ministers with NATO on April 19; and 3) a meeting of the Heads of Government of France, the U.K. and the U.S. at Geneva on April 20.

B. Composition

In order to facilitate discussion in a small forum and to maintain the principle of four-power responsibility for Germany and Berlin, the East-West summit should be restricted to the Heads of Government of France, the U.K., the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

C. Title and Agenda

Bearing in mind the relationship between agenda formulation and the question of participation, the Working Group agreed that a general description would be desirable because: 1) it would permit the introduction of any topic the Western Powers might consider desirable; 2) it would facilitate efforts by the Western side to prevent the development of undue public expectations, thereby averting disillusionment or the growth of public pressure to reach agreements which might prove meaningless; and 3) it would help reduce pressures from other nations to participate in the meeting.

The following formulas have been proposed:

U.S. - "The Heads of Government will review the work of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers and consider other outstanding international questions."

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U.K. - "The Heads of Government will meet to discuss East-West relations in their several aspects."

Ger. - "The Heads of Government will review the work of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers and concentrate on disarmament and other outstanding international problems, discussions of which might facilitate solution of problems discussed by the Foreign Ministers at Geneva."

The Western Powers would, however, have to agree among themselves as to what items to discuss with the Soviets. Items that have been considered in the Working Group are discussed in Sections IV, V, VI, and VII below.

D. Arrangements with the Soviets

The Heads of Government of France, the U.K., and the U.S. might give consideration to the question of addressing separate but similarly worded messages to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. inviting him to join them for a meeting at Geneva from April 21-26. The Western notes should indicate that all participants will be free to discuss any topic they wish. (Draft note attached as Annex ____.)

E. Continued Western Consultation

Upon the receipt of guidance from the Western Heads of Government, the Working Group should seek further to coordinate Western positions through continued consultation at Washington. As work progresses it is considered desirable to have experts from the four governments available in Washington for Working Group meetings. The report of the Working Group should be reviewed by the four Western Foreign Ministers at Paris from April 14-18 and subsequently by the three Western Heads of Government at Geneva on April 20.

F. Consultation with NATO

Arrangements should be made to consult and exchange views with our NATO partners, particularly during the intensive period of consultation that is envisaged during the weeks prior to the East-West meeting. Arrangements have already been made for consultation at the December 15-17 NATO Ministerial Meeting and again immediately after the Western summit of December 19-21. There could perhaps be similar consultation again immediately before and after the East-West summit conference in April. Consideration might also be given to having a NATO representative attend the Working Group meetings during the intensive period of consultation several

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weeks prior to the East-West summit. The Working Group agreed that it would be useful to send agreed reports to NATO as developments warrant.

II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUMMIT

Recent discussions involving frank exchanges of opinion between representatives of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have served to clarify positions and to reduce possibilities of miscalculation arising from misunderstandings. Specifically, these exchanges of opinion have led to at least the temporary removal of the element of duress which was implicit in Soviet actions relating to West Berlin in November, 1958.

Experience shows, in connection with recent high-level meetings, that public expectations can be held within manageable bounds if conscious efforts are directed toward this end. This has direct relevance to a summit meeting in that Western governments may, through concerted efforts, avert disillusionment or the growth of public pressures which might work to the disadvantage of the West.

These developments, taken in conjunction with conciliatory gestures on the part of the Soviets, appear to offer sufficient prospect of serious negotiation with the Soviet Union, despite the lack of any shift in basic Soviet positions, and to justify further probing of Soviet intentions at a summit meeting.



The Working Group does not envisage a conference which achieves final agreement on a wide range of outstanding questions. Present expectations are limited to a better and more workable definition of outstanding issues and the firmer establishment of an attitude of reasonableness in order to create the setting for what will be a long process of wearing down and changing the world outlook and long-range intentions of the Soviet leaders, both by negotiation and by other means, and to induce Soviet leaders to voluntarily limit the methods used in pursuing their political aims.

It was agreed that the Working Group should consider practical measures directed toward limiting public expectations and that each government should instruct its information services and diplomatic representatives to take appropriate action with respect to this problem. Similar action by all NATO governments would be desirable.

III. SOVIET NEGOTIATING INTENTIONS

The Working Group assumes that it is one of the fundamental precepts of Soviet foreign policy to avoid undertaking unnecessary risks that might endanger the Soviet Union or the rule of the Communist Party itself. Khrushchev has apparently decided to shift tactics and to pursue a policy of detente and gradualism as the best means of achieving Soviet objectives under existing world

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conditions. Khrushchev has made it clear that he is convinced that the communist economic and social system, soon rather than late, will "bury capitalism" and that this certain victory will best be achieved if there is no disturbance of the Soviet bloc's economic development and if nuclear war is avoided.

Immediate Soviet negotiating aims at an East-West summit appear to the Working Group to be the following:

1) Atmosphere. The Soviets are likely to conduct themselves so as to continue an atmosphere of detente.

2) Germany. The peace treaty proposals will no doubt be tabled. Khrushchev presumably expects to come out of the summit with an agreement which does not exclude the possibility of his signing a separate peace treaty with Eastern Germany in the near or foreseeable future.

3) Berlin. The principal Soviet objective, as the Working Group sees it, will be to achieve an agreement which would open the way to a gradual take-over of Berlin, i.e., by a process of erosion rather than by frontal assault. More specifically, the Soviets can be expected to seek an agreement which would (a) signify Western acceptance or, at a minimum, acquiescence in the principle that the Western occupation regime should be ended; (b) point the way to a reduction and ultimate withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin; (c) necessitate increased contacts and acceptance of the East German regime by the Western Powers and increased contacts between East and West Germany on an official level; and (d) increase opportunities for Eastern Germany to undermine West Berlin's economic dependence and ties with the West.

4) General Disarmament. Khrushchev can be expected to use the summit forum to gain as much propaganda mileage as possible out of his disarmament proposals. This does not, however, preclude an interest in serious negotiations. It is also anticipated that he will attempt to obtain agreement in principle that the newly established ten-nation disarmament group should work toward a "general and complete" disarmament agreement, thus placing Soviet proposals in the forefront of matters to be discussed in the ten-nation group.

5) Partial Disarmament Measures. Aware that an agreement on general and complete disarmament may be impracticable in the foreseeable future, Khrushchev can be expected to express willingness to reach agreements on such partial measures which would work to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

6) Other Items. Other items which Khrushchev might raise are: (a) non-interference in internal affairs, (b) the removal of discriminatory

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practices relating to trade and the granting of credits, (c) increasing international cultural, technical, and scientific exchanges, and (d) furthering joint scientific projects. (See Annex I for a summary Working Group paper on "Probable Soviet Intentions.")

IV. GERMANY AND BERLIN

The Working Group's assessment of Soviet intentions at an East-West summit is that Khrushchev will almost certainly place strong emphasis on Soviet peace treaty proposals. He will argue that these provide the only tenable approach to a solution of the German problem given the factual existence of the two German states. Khrushchev will further contend that the signing of such a peace treaty will automatically end the Allied occupation in Berlin, and all rights deriving therefrom, alleging that West Berlin is rightfully and legally a part of the German Democratic Republic to which it would thus be restored.

Guidance from governments will be required on a number of points to enable useful continuation of work on preparation of the Western position for the East-West summit. The following questions raise the most important issues or operating assumptions on which agreement must be reached before the Western position can be fully developed:



(1) On the assumption that Khrushchev will begin by reiterating the Soviet peace treaty proposals, should the West respond by putting forward the Western Peace Plan?

(2) If so, can the Peace Plan be modified in any way to make it more negotiable or to demonstrate continued Western sincerity in attempting to achieve German reunification?

(3) Are there circumstances under which it would be advantageous for the Western Powers to offer to discuss the principles of a peace treaty on a quadripartite basis?

(4) Must the Western Powers be prepared at the summit, as they were at Geneva, eventually to discuss Berlin outside of the context of German reunification?

(5) On the assumption that German reunification is not likely to be achieved within the foreseeable future, can maintenance of the status quo be considered a feasible course of action given the announced Soviet intention to proceed with the signing of a separate peace treaty with the GDR should a modus vivendi not be achieved on Berlin?

(6) Is there any practical way of deterring the Soviet Union from signing such a separate peace treaty with the GDR in the absence of a modus vivendi on Berlin?

(7) If

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(7) If the Soviet Union does sign such a separate peace treaty with the GDR in the absence of a modus vivendi on Berlin, can the Western position on Berlin be maintained over the long run under the changed conditions which would result?

(8) Could the Western position be maintained in Berlin under these circumstances without an over enlarging degree of recognition of the GDR rising out of the practical problems which substitution of GDR officials for Soviet officials would create?

(9) On the assumption that German reunification is not likely to be achieved within the foreseeable future and that, therefore, some arrangement on Berlin should be sought which is designed to be valid for a considerable period of time, (a) should the Western Powers attempt to move towards such a solution via an interim arrangement of the kind discussed at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, or (b) should the forthcoming East-West summit be used in an effort to achieve directly an arrangement which would be designed to continue until reunification?

(10) Is the Western negotiating position likely to be stronger or weaker than it is now at the expiration of the period of time envisaged in a Geneva-type interim arrangement?

(11) Can proposals be developed for an arrangement on Berlin designed to last until reunification which would be acceptable to the West and consistent with its obligations to maintain the freedom of the city? Should those charged on the Western side with preparing for the East-West summit meeting be given the task of considering the possibility of such proposals?

(12) If an agreement can be achieved with the Soviets designed to be valid until reunification, are the Soviets likely to continue to respect it indefinitely? (See Annex II for the full Working Group report on Germany and Berlin.)

V. DISARMAMENT

In view of the establishment of the ten-nation disarmament group, whose membership includes the Western governments of Canada, France, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S., the Working Group agreed that it should restrict itself to matters of a procedural nature and to a discussion of principles that ought to underlie disarmament agreements. Conversely, it was agreed that a discussion of substantive disarmament matters should be the province of the Western members of the ten-nation group.

A. Procedural

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A. Procedural

In view of the presently foreseen schedules, the relationship of the East-West summit negotiations and the general disarmament negotiations present a major problem for consideration and decision by the Heads of Government.

Two convening dates have been proposed. (1) It has been suggested that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Group meet after the East-West summit, i.e. around May 15, in the belief that the summit would provide a more dramatic framework for a new Western proposal and also permit the principals to establish guidelines and to set the tone for the detailed deliberations in the Ten-Nation Group. (2) If this date proves impractical, the Working Group suggests that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Group meet no earlier than March 15 in order that sufficient time be available for the five Western powers to coordinate the Western position.

B. Principles

(To be agreed on.)



VI. EAST-WEST CONFLICTS

In a meeting with Khrushchev such as the projected summit, discussion of conflicts between the free and communist worlds is almost inevitable. The themes which Khrushchev will develop will very likely not be greatly different from those he has presented in bilateral meetings with Western Heads of Government. They will undoubtedly include peaceful coexistence, the changing correlation of forces, non-interference in internal affairs, and liquidation of the cold war.

The Working Group believes that each Western Head of Government should be prepared to rebut Mr. Khrushchev's themes with firm and forceful counter-arguments in order to disabuse Mr. Khrushchev of the impression that a detente between East and West can take place merely through an improvement in atmosphere rather than through agreement on substantive issues which presently divide the communist and the free worlds.

VII. AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

(Report to be prepared after the French side clarifies President de Gaulle's views.)

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